The Siege of Gdańsk 1807. English Fleet arrives.

[Nightbomber]

I have just read an interesting article about the Siege of Gdańsk that took place in 1807 and found that even English Fleet took a significant part in the struggle. Unfortunately Wiki does not reveal any information about the sea battle.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Danzig_(1807)

While the battle description was very interesting, one thing caught my attention. The difference in artillery drill in English and French Navy of the era. According to the author, the English drill was focused on the rate of fire at close distance, while the French commanders relied rather on medium to long range fire and accuracy. The English artillerymen could fire one shell and get the cannon reloaded in a minute.
Any thoughts and comments?

[David Manley]

The RN has a long and illustrious history of operating in the Baltic. Read Hornblower for a dramatised account of operations in the 1812 campaign. And later as well; it is not for nothing that the firsh Single Role Mine Hunter delivered to the Estonian navy is called Admiral Cowan

[Пилот]

Those were the glorious days of French arms!

[csadn]

Those were the glorious days of French arms!

Yes -- I was noting who won.... >;)

[Пилот]

Before 1812 no one had beaten Napoleon. On the other hand, it was his blame for losing 600 000 strong army in Russia... Although Poles well advised him to bring twice as many horses! And even so, he fought well against odds in 1813 and 1814. He almost won at Waterloo 1815. Wellington was near defeat when Prussians came. So, those days were glorious

[csadn]

He almost won at Waterloo 1815. Wellington was near defeat when Prussians came. So, those days were glorious

Heck, Napoleon could still have recovered from Waterloo -- the problem was Fouche and others were taking advantage of his preoccupation to make sure he had no base of support in France when he returned.

[Berthier]

I think Napoleon's loss at Waterloo was probably fatal to his cause despite the political intrigues in Paris. This was the first time a French army under him had been shattered in a single battle, losses to his veteran troops were high and morale consequently suffered. The loss of a sense of invulnerability was irredeemable and although Grouchy's corps was intact and fought well on the retreat back from the border, the boost to the Allied cause was immeasurable. With the Austrians and Russians coming on line within six weeks I cant see how he could have hung on. It would have been 1814 all over again.

[csadn]

I think Napoleon's loss at Waterloo was probably fatal to his cause despite the political intrigues in Paris. This was the first time a French army under him had been shattered in a single battle, losses to his veteran troops were high and morale consequently suffered. The loss of a sense of invulnerability was irredeemable and although Grouchy's corps was intact and fought well on the retreat back from the border, the boost to the Allied cause was immeasurable. With the Austrians and Russians coming on line within six weeks I cant see how he could have hung on. It would have been 1814 all over again.

There's some discussion about that -- Nappy's back had been to the wall before, and he'd pulled it off. Of course, this time he was going up against someone who was even more of a scumbag than himself -- one Joseph Fouche....

(Perfect name for a Marshal -- "Grouchy".... :) )

[Comte de Brueys]

...and although Grouchy's corps was intact and fought well on the retreat back from the border, the boost to the Allied cause was immeasurable. With the Austrians and Russians coming on line within six weeks I cant see how he could have hung on. It would have been 1814 all over again.

Right Daniel.

Unfortunately Grouchy failed during the battle.

Instead of pressing the beaten Prussians more hard after the Battle of Ligny, he hesitated too much.

A popular theory here is: What if Grouchy had lead the attack on Quatre-Bras (more planed and efficient) and Ney had lead the pursuit of the Prussians (more fierce).


But at all I agree, that it would have ended like 1814, anyways.

[Пилот]

Wellington on his own was defeated. Prussians saved the day for Allies. I do believe that if French exploited chance of Quatre-Bras, there wouldn't be Waterloo. Although, strategically, at the end, Napoleon would be defeated similarly as in 1814. France was dried out.

Unfortunately, all SoG games will actually be "would be" scenarios... Historical accounts say all clashes and battles usually ended in British victories (with less than few exceptions).

[csadn]

Wellington on his own was defeated. Prussians saved the day for Allies. I do believe that if French exploited chance of Quatre-Bras, there wouldn't be Waterloo. Although, strategically, at the end, Napoleon would be defeated similarly as in 1814. France was dried out.

Not even that -- there was an opportunity after Waterloo for Napoleon to rebuild a defensive-only force to keep the Allies out of France proper. Unfortunately for Boney, enough other people knew this to act in time to prevent him doing it....

France in the 18th and 19th centuries made the same mistake Germany would make in the 20th -- declaring war in all directions at once....

[Пилот]

Russians and Austrians were (or would be ready) ready with huge forces. Prussians too. Don't forget Swedes. I'm not sure about defensive forces' ability to defend France from coordinated allied attack.

[csadn]

Russians and Austrians were (or would be ready) ready with huge forces. Prussians too. Don't forget Swedes. I'm not sure about defensive forces' ability to defend France from coordinated allied attack.

"Coordinated attacks" weren't really possible back then -- if they happened, it was blind luck; usually, someone (or several someones) didn't leave on time, or got slowed down, or....

And then there's the question of "defending home soil"; France had managed to do that even after getting its ass kicked in Russia and at Leipzig [see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six_Days%27_Campaign ]. The main reason Paris fell in 1814 was the lack of competence in the commanders Napoleon left there; one wonders what might have been accomplished had Boney been defending Paris rather than counterpunching Blucher.

[Пилот]

Of course I don't mean "coordinated" as today, but coordinated enough to make problems to the Emperor. I believe, if not in 1815, then in 1816 we would have more material for today's wargaming, but also more sad fighting on French soil and ultimate French defeat.

[DeRuyter]

"Coordinated attacks" weren't really possible back then -- if they happened, it was blind luck; usually, someone (or several someones) didn't leave on time, or got slowed down, or....

And then there's the question of "defending home soil"; France had managed to do that even after getting its ass kicked in Russia and at Leipzig [see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six_Days%27_Campaign ]. The main reason Paris fell in 1814 was the lack of competence in the commanders Napoleon left there; one wonders what might have been accomplished had Boney been defending Paris rather than counterpunching Blucher.

The 1814 campaign saw the return of Napoleon's strategic and tactical brilliance for a brief time. Operating on interior lines as in 1815 he was able to exploit the Allies lack of coordination and make up for his lack of numbers; however eventually the Allies overwhelming numerical superiority caught up to him.

I wouldn't categorically state it was impossible to coordinate attacks or that it was down to luck, some of Napoleon's most brilliant victories relied on his army corps to conduct coordinated movements, i.e.; Ulm. While some of his "almost" decisive victories came down to a lack of coordination, or the fog of war, i.e.; Eylau, Ligny. I would cite Waterloo as an example of successful coordination among allied armies in the era.

[csadn]

I wouldn't categorically state it was impossible to coordinate attacks or that it was down to luck, some of Napoleon's most brilliant victories relied on his army corps to conduct coordinated movements, i.e.; Ulm. While some of his "almost" decisive victories came down to a lack of coordination, or the fog of war, i.e.; Eylau, Ligny. I would cite Waterloo as an example of successful coordination among allied armies in the era.

Napoleon understood the difficulty of coordinating multiple forces; it's one of the reasons he came up with "the war of the central position": Keep one's own army together for better coordination while at the same time splitting the enemy so he *cannot* coordinate, then crush one part while holding off the other. Waterloo was the most-obvious failure of this strategy; he failed to prevent the armies linking up (contrast with Quatre Bras and Ligny shortly before), and got squashed.

[Пилот]

And, don't forget, France was tired from wars. Motivation in 1816 wouldn't be the same as in 1806.

[csadn]

And, don't forget, France was tired from wars. Motivation in 1816 wouldn't be the same as in 1806.

So was everyone else -- there were folks in the armies at Waterloo who had *never* known a time when there *wasn't* a war between France and someone (the Rev/Napoleonic Wars lasted *26 years*).

[DeRuyter]

And, don't forget, France was tired from wars. Motivation in 1816 wouldn't be the same as in 1806.

So was everyone else -- there were folks in the armies at Waterloo who had *never* known a time when there *wasn't* a war between France and someone (the Rev/Napoleonic Wars lasted *26 years*).

I think the key line to add is: The French Marshals and Generals were tired of war and lacked motivation of their former campaigns. While the Prussians and most certainly Blucher had revenge as motivation.

[csadn]

I think the key line to add is: The French Marshals and Generals were tired of war and lacked motivation of their former campaigns. While the Prussians and most certainly Blucher had revenge as motivation.

True -- but on the Allied side, the exhaustion was mainly economic; a quarter-century on a war economy is not healthy. So it became a question of whose morale would break first... and as Nappy himself, said, "Morale is to physical as three is to one."