View Full Version : On This Day 12 September
On 12 September 1810, the 10-gun schooner HMS Alban, under the command of Lieutenant Samuel Thomas, was off Læsø island when she saw six Danish gunboats coming towards her from the direction of the Skaw. Wind conditions were calm so Alban had to resort to her sweeps to try to escape the Danes. She was unsuccessful and by early afternoon an engagement had commenced. After about three hours, a cannon shot took off the back of Thomas's skull. His second in command, Midshipman Alexander Hutchinson, continued the resistance for another hour, but then struck. Alban had lost two men killed (including Thomas), and had three wounded, out of a crew of some 25. She also had five feet of water in her hold, and her rigging and sails were entirely shot away. The subsequent court martial honourably acquitted Hutchinson and the surviving officers and men, and recommended Hutchinson for promotion. The Danish gunboat flotilla was under the command of Lieutenant Jørgen Conrad de Falsen.
It says something about the Royal Navy that so many of these small-ship actions ended in their being defeated -- sort-of confirms the argument that the RN shorted small ships in favor of SoLs.
David Manley
09-12-2012, 13:43
Not really. I wouldn't call the postings here entirely representative. I know the abandonment of the small ship navy is a bit of a pet theory of yours butas we've debated in the past it doesn't really hold water. Especially not if you look at the comparative record of frigate vs frigate encounters (where the success rate was pretty bloody good), coastal operations, cutting out operations etc.. Like many successful organisations the RN's detractors can always point out a number of failures and draw the conclusion of endemic failure, but a more rational examination often shows a rather different story. In modern days I've seen detractors of the USN point to the number of high profile collisions and groundings recently to show a severe decline in seamanship and navigation standards, but a deeper study shows an accident rate no better or worse than normal.
David Manley
09-12-2012, 22:05
On This Day 13 September
On 9 September Vice-Admiral Mitchell detached Arrow and Wolverine to attack a ship and a brig belonging to the Batavian Republic and anchored under the Vlie at the entrance to the Texel. Arrow had to lighten ship and the following day they crossed over the Flack abreast of Wieringen and saw the enemy in the passage leading from Vlie Island towards Harlingen. On 12 September Wolverine anchored within 60 yards of the brig and only had to fire one gun before the brig hauled down her colours. She proved to be the Gier, armed with fourteen 12-pounders. Arrow exchanged broadsides with the ship, Draak, of 24 guns (six 50-pound brass howitzers, two 32-pounder guns, and sixteen long 18-pounder guns), which surrendered when Wolverine came up. Draak turned out to be a sheer hulk so Captain Bolton burnt her. The British also captured two schooners, each of four 8-pounder guns, and four schuyts, each of two 8-pounder guns. The Dutch prisoners numbered 380 men.[11] In 1847 the Admiralty awarded the Naval General Service Medal with clasps "Arrow 13 Sept 1799" and "Wolverine 13 Sept. 1799" to any survivors of the two crews that claimed them
On 9 September Vice-Admiral Mitchell detached Arrow and Wolverine to attack a ship and a brig belonging to the Batavian Republic and anchored under the Vlie at the entrance to the Texel. Arrow had to lighten ship and the following day they crossed over the Flack abreast of Wieringen and saw the enemy in the passage leading from Vlie Island towards Harlingen. On 12 September Wolverine anchored within 60 yards of the brig and only had to fire one gun before the brig hauled down her colours. She proved to be the Gier, armed with fourteen 12-pounders. Arrow exchanged broadsides with the ship, Draak, of 24 guns (six 50-pound brass howitzers, two 32-pounder guns, and sixteen long 18-pounder guns), which surrendered when Wolverine came up. Draak turned out to be a sheer hulk so Captain Bolton burnt her. The British also captured two schooners, each of four 8-pounder guns, and four schuyts, each of two 8-pounder guns. The Dutch prisoners numbered 380 men.[11] In 1847 the Admiralty awarded the Naval General Service Medal with clasps "Arrow 13 Sept 1799" and "Wolverine 13 Sept. 1799" to any survivors of the two crews that claimed them
Not much of a battle, really -- one gives up without resistance; the other was a sitting duck. Contrast with Coog's reports of Continentals who actually put up a fight.
David Manley
09-13-2012, 12:49
Tetchy :) When doing an "on this day in history" one can only work with what one has. Just wait a few days :)
Tetchy :) When doing an "on this day in history" one can only work with what one has. Just wait a few days :)
More like "tetched", but....
My actual point is: In SoL battles, the British crushed everyone in their path; below that, tho', when there's a fight, the results are much more equal. The question then becomes "why is this the case?".
David Manley
09-15-2012, 05:35
Some suggestions:
1) The "Inshore Squadrons" were the training ground for the fleet. Officers (and to a lesser extent their crews) cut their teeth in ships like this where failure (whilst regrettable) rarely had the strategic impact that could come from defeat of a larger ship or squadron. The best commanders went on to positions of responsibility in the larger ships (the idea that "interest" and "patronage" drove the promotion and placement of officers is pretty much a myth driven by historical fiction of the last 50 years or so - whilst it definitely did occur a careful study of RN personnel management shows that its influence was nowhere as strong as some may have you believe; command ability was ably recognised and ably rewarded.
2) The number of ships involved is an order of magnitude greater than the number of liners, and the number of actions in which small ships were involved over the years is at least 2 orders of magnitude greater. With a far bigger sample size it is no surprise that the other guys do good once in a while.
3) The failures in the French, Spanish (and occasional other) fleets was due to a number of factors, a significant one being the inability to train at sea due to the extensive blockades to which the RN subjected its enemy's fleet units. And not just an inability to train the ships crews, but also the command structure needed to coordinate the manoeuvres and actions of a fleet at sea. So the enemy's battlefleets were penalised at a number of levels. Small ship operations were far harder to restrict. Small ships were thereofre far more prevalent at sea, their crews were able to gain experience that their big ship brethren could not.
4) Your perception that the RN's performance in small ship operations is poor is incorrect. Just for fun I looked through a list of RN encounters in the month of May (it was the month I had data for to hand) during the Napoleonic Wars. There were 69 notable small ship engagements listed of which 8 were RN defeats (engagements resulting in the loss of a ship), 3 "encounters" (no clear winner) and 58 RN "wins" - where at least one enemy ship was captured or destroyed. Actually several of those actions resulted in the loss of more than one enemy ship (one action saw 20 gunboats destroyed, another resulted in more than 10 captures). I suppose its possible that I inadvertently used the most spectacularly successful month, but I don't think that's likely. To my mind a 58:8 success rate is pretty good. and that doesn't include another dozen or so notable shore party raids launched from frigates and smaller ships with the aim of destroying enemy shore batteries and other facilities.
There's a few thoughts off the top of my head. I'm sure there are others.
(the idea that "interest" and "patronage" drove the promotion and placement of officers is pretty much a myth driven by historical fiction of the last 50 years or so - whilst it definitely did occur a careful study of RN personnel management shows that its influence was nowhere as strong as some may have you believe; command ability was ably recognised and ably rewarded.
"Interest" and "patronage" drive *peacetime* promotion (that is, in those times when active fighting isn't occurring). It's when the actual fighting begins that actual talent starts being rewarded -- I recall reading somewhere that in every war where records exist, in the first 6 months of fighting some 2/3 of the officer corps will be replaced (dead, captured, or terminated for cause), and by the war's end 2/3 of the remainder will also have been similarly removed.
If I remember correctly, Nelson received a merchantman's commission from his uncle -- and that very nearly ended Nelson's naval career before it began; the merchies told him so many horror stories of the RN's treatment of sailors (including mids), it took much effort on Nelson's uncle's part to convince him it wasn't universally the case (it's believed this is part of why Nelson was quite so well-known for looking after his sailors).
As to the win-loss record: I'm mainly going by what Coog digs up; and what he's finding is a track record of failure and defeat which may explain why there's a ten-year gap between the last major naval battle of the Napoleonic Wars (Trafalgar) and the actual end of same. (Granted, most of the land defeats seem to have the same root cause -- namely: Prussian and Austrian commanders....) Also: Destroying ships doesn't always equal victory -- hint: Valcour Island.
David Manley
09-15-2012, 22:00
"Interest" and "patronage" drive *peacetime* promotion
It might well do. My purpose in posting what I did was really to counter the popularist view that in the RN it did so in wartime as well. It is unfortunate that many people inadvertently confuse the fiction of messers O'Brein, Pope, Kent, Forester, etc. with reality so i wanted to head that off at the pass (we lambast Hollywierd and its followers for gash such as U-571, Troy and The Patriot but the reality/fiction conundrum spreads wider and further back)
As to the win-loss record: I'm mainly going by what Coog digs up
You are kidding, aren't you? Coog does a great job in pulling together a few interesting snippets, and bless him for doing so, but its scratching the surface. I've been reading myself in on this for 35 years and I'm still learning. You might want to try books such as the Naval Chronicle, James' and Clowes' histories of the Royal Navy, Wareham's work on the management and development of frigate command, Gardiner's excellent work on frigates of the Napoleonic wars, Lambert's recent work on 1812 or any one of dozens .
Also: Destroying ships doesn't always equal victory -- hint: Valcour Island.
Yes, I'm aware of that (Pearl Harbour springs to mind - tactical victory, although job only half done, strategic clusterf**k). and the converse is true - losing a ship does not necessarily equal a defeat (hint: several convoy actions in which a sloop of brig was lost holding off one or more attackers whilst the convoy escaped unharmed). You need to look at the context. Of course I'm teaching you to suck eggs, but my point is this. You can pick a few isolated (but quite notable) incidents and draw a broad conclusion (as I said earlier some, including the US media, were concluding that seamanship and navigation standards in the USN were diving because of the number of high profile incidents occurring in the last few years, but a deeper study showed an accident rate no better or worse than usual); for a fuller understanding you need to put those in context and look a LOT deeper and wider. If you do you'll find a story that is very, very different.
It might well do. My purpose in posting what I did was really to counter the popularist view that in the RN it did so in wartime as well. It is unfortunate that many people inadvertently confuse the fiction of messers O'Brein, Pope, Kent, Forester, etc. with reality so i wanted to head that off at the pass (we lambast Hollywierd and its followers for gash such as U-571, Troy and The Patriot but the reality/fiction conundrum spreads wider and further back)
The authors I talk to say: "The problem with Fiction vs. Reality is Fiction has to 'make sense' -- if one takes an actual historical incident, and tries to write it as faction, no one will ever believe it".
You are kidding, aren't you? Coog does a great job in pulling together a few interesting snippets, and bless him for doing so, but its scratching the surface.
Perhaps you should direct him there, as well. :)
Yes, I'm aware of that (Pearl Harbour springs to mind - tactical victory, although job only half done, strategic clusterf**k).
I'll go further -- I have argued more than once that Japan *lost* Pearl Harbor, between all they failed to accomplish and how much more damage they could have inflicted if they'd been a bit more patient (as in: Wait for the USN to steam to the Philippines, *then* spring the six-CV surprise on them). Granted, this argument is mostly for the benefit of people who think Dugout Doug MacArthur had any business retaining his stars after the Philippine catastrophe (talk about "revisionist idiots"...).
Which leads to the "context" issue: As I pointed out, the last major naval battle of the Napoleonic Wars was in 1805; Napoleon was not done away with until *1815*. And this is before railroads, and easy land transport of supplies; most shipping had to be, well, shipped. Nappy's bunch were a going concern right up to where Marshal Winter had his way with them in Russia (it's an odd coincidence that Austerlitz happened about the same time as Trafalgar, and the Spanish campaign was still going on when Napoleon first abdicated, illustrating that while Britain controlled the seas, it was effectively impotent on the Continent proper); so what was the blockade accomplishing? Add to this the accounts of the small-ship actions, and there's room to argue over Britain's ability to successfully fight a naval war outside the big set-piece battles.
David Manley
09-16-2012, 21:19
So what was the blockade accomplishing?
A number of things, but primarily the stifling of the enemy's ability to pose a threat to the mainland UK and her colonies, maintaining communications with the UK's allies in Europe and around the world, and protecting British trade.
it was effectively impotent on the Continent proper
Standfast the Iberian Peninsula of course. Thats not entirely surprising from a purely military aspect. Difficult to see how the Channel Fleet could have intervened at Leipzig. But thats where allies come in. The Austrians were similarly impotent at sea. Britain's role in Europe was primarily diplomatic and financial. But command of the sea was a key enabler in achieving this.
Add to this the accounts of the small-ship actions, and there's room to argue over Britain's ability to successfully fight a naval war outside the big set-piece battles.
Except I don't agree in any way, shape or form with your hypothesis, which is based on a very small subset of a very large number of actions and events, for the reasons I've stated many times before. It would help if I could find a credible naval historian who had a similar view, but such a beast is proving rather difficult to find :)
A number of things, but primarily the stifling of the enemy's ability to pose a threat to the mainland UK and her colonies, maintaining communications with the UK's allies in Europe and around the world, and protecting British trade.
From what I've read: The main trade being stifled was Britain's -- with the "Continental System" in place, Britain couldn't trade with anyone except "under the table", or with territory it controlled outright (Portugal and those parts of Spain taken in the Peninsular Campaign).
Standfast the Iberian Peninsula of course.
And Britain wouldn't have been able to do that much were it not for Napoleon's grasping stupidity in overthrowing the Spanish crown and installing family in its place.
Thats not entirely surprising from a purely military aspect. Difficult to see how the Channel Fleet could have intervened at Leipzig. But thats where allies come in. The Austrians were similarly impotent at sea./[quote]
Given the overall performance of the Austrians throughout the war (and the Prussians and Russians weren't much better): They were pretty-much as impotent on land as at sea. Britain didn't start seeing consistent wins against Napoleon until it put redcoats on the Continent.
[QUOTE=David Manley;4923]Britain's role in Europe was primarily diplomatic and financial. But command of the sea was a key enabler in achieving this.
See above -- all their diplomacy and financial aid accomplished exactly Squat; it wasn't until British troops made landfall on the Continent that the French started losing on land as regularly as they lost at sea.
Except I don't agree in any way, shape or form with your hypothesis, which is based on a very small subset of a very large number of actions and events, for the reasons I've stated many times before. It would help if I could find a credible naval historian who had a similar view, but such a beast is proving rather difficult to find :)
Perhaps it's because most of them have looked at the facts, and realized how much of the history of the Napoleonic Wars has in common with the history of the Roman conquests of the "barbarians" -- namely: Said histories were written by the winners.... >;)
(I had a similar problem with my term paper on the Texas Rangers' founding in university -- the only written histories were those of the Texans; the Mexicans did not comment extensively on the period, and the Comanche wrote nothing at all. Trying to find "balance" was a pain in the ass.)
David Manley
09-17-2012, 16:03
So the French only started losing on land when the British, who you said were "effectively impotent on the Continent proper" put boots on the ground.
Britain couldn't trade with anyone except "under the table", or with territory it controlled outright (Portugal and those parts of Spain taken in the Peninsular Campaign).
And Sweden, and Russia. And that "under the table" trade was worth a fortune as no-ne (not even many French traders) were al that happy going along with Boney's decrees. French overseas trade, on the other hand, was crippled by the RN.
Perhaps it's because most of them have looked at the facts, and realized how much of the history of the Napoleonic Wars has in common with the history of the Roman conquests of the "barbarians" -- namely: Said histories were written by the winners.
Except there are plenty of French naval historians who also support the view. Or do you think they are all just going along with it for an easy life? Given that a Frenchman will take any opportunity to do the Brits down I hardly think that's likely :)
all their diplomacy and financial aid accomplished exactly Squat
apart from leeping the continental powers in the fight. Which was pretty bloody important.
So the French only started losing on land when the British, who you said were "effectively impotent on the Continent proper" put boots on the ground.
"Impotent" in that they were forced to rely on Hired Help to fight the land campaigns -- and said Hired Help proving to be hopelessly inept. Potency was only achieved when British troops got into the fighting; and to accomplish that, Britain needed to either perform an assault landing on the Continent (not effectively possible at the time due to tech limitations and terrain -- witness the occupation of Toulon), or wait for someone to let them in (which Portugal did in 1808).
And Sweden, and Russia. And that "under the table" trade was worth a fortune as no-ne (not even many French traders) were al that happy going along with Boney's decrees.
Black markets are always an excellent means of generating income -- it surprises me Boney didn't have a finger in it himself. I'll grant that French naval impotence allowed Sweden and Russia to tell Boney to get bent; but Sweden's resistance got it invaded by Russia (then a French ally) in 1808, and Russia's resistance got it invaded in 1812.
[QUOTE=David Manley;4926]French overseas trade, on the other hand, was crippled by the RN.
They didn't have that much overseas trade to begin with -- colonies existed, but various factors conspired to ensure France made little to no money off them (ineffective tax systems; the various wars of the 1700s which put the debt up while providing no gains; the revocation of the Edict of Nantes sending artisans and other trained workers fleeing elsewhere; etc.).
Except there are plenty of French naval historians who also support the view. Or do you think they are all just going along with it for an easy life? Given that a Frenchman will take any opportunity to do the Brits down I hardly think that's likely :)
Given the French war record, I think they've hit "Daffy Duck Syndrome":
"SHOOT ME AGAIN! I ENJOY IT! I LOVE THE SMELL OF BURN FEATHERS, AND GUNPOWDER, AND CORDITE! I'M AN ELK! SHOOT ME, GO ON! IT'S ELK SEASON! I'M A FIDDLER CRAB! WHY DON'T YOU SHOOT ME? IT'S FIDDLER CRAB SEASON!"
[ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-pChZeIE_3o ]
apart from leeping the continental powers in the fight. Which was pretty bloody important.
The "Continental Powers" flipped sides more frequently than a zocchihedron in an earthquake; the only effect they had was to keep France and its territory on a constant war footing (which mainly allowed the French land forces to gain more experience slapping around hopelessly-inept Central Europeans); as noted, it required a combination of Napoleon's political ineptitude, and the British themselves arriving on the Continent, for the anti-Revolutionaries to make any noticeable progress against Nappy.
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