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Coog
08-13-2012, 23:12
At 5 a.m. on the morning of 14 August 1813, USS Argus, under the command of Master Commandant William Henry Allen, and HMS Pelican, under the command of Commander John Fordyce Maple, sighted each other 5 leagues (about 15 miles) west of St. David's Head. The Argus had been engaged in commerce raiding. The Argus was the faster but more lightly armed vessel (with eighteen 24-pounder carronades and a 12-pounder chase gun, against the Pelican's sixteen 32-pounder carronades, and one 12-pounder long gun and two 6-pounder long guns) and Allen could have escaped. Instead, he accepted battle. The wind was from the south, giving the Pelican the advantage of the windward position. Allen sailed westward on the starboard tack (i.e. with the wind to port) and opposed his port side battery to the Pelican's starboard battery.

Four minutes after the first broadsides were fired, Allen lost a leg. His First Lieutenant was also badly wounded, and the Argus's rigging was badly cut up. The Pelican tried to cross the Argus's stern to deliver raking fire but the Argus's Second Lieutenant, William Howard Allen (not related to the commander), threw his sails aback to slow the American brig and instead raked the Pelican. This did not fatally cripple the British vessel, and the two brigs continued to exchange broadsides, with the Pelican now to leeward. After four more minutes, the rigging of the Argus was too badly damaged for the Americans to prevent the Pelican from crossing the stern of the Argus and delivering several raking broadsides.

Finally, three quarters of an hour after the action began, the two vessels came into contact, with the bow of the Argus against the quarter of the Pelican. As British boarding parties mustered but before they could board the Argus, the Americans surrendered.


The Pelican and Argus went in to Plymouth. Allen died there of his wounds a week after the battle. He was buried with full military honours. The rest of the crew, including sailing master Uriah P. Levy, was taken prisoner and held in England for the duration of the war.

Unusually for the War of 1812, the American gunnery in this engagement was comparatively ineffective (although Pelican's sides were "filled with grapeshot" and two carronades had been dismounted). British gunnery was "at least of the standard which had brought victory in a hundred victories against the French." Allen's decision to accept battle against a heavier opponent rather than to continue his effective commerce raiding has not been explained.

Coog
08-13-2012, 23:28
The East Indiaman Lord Nelson, under Captain Robert Spottiswoode, was on her return voyage when on 14 August 1803 she encountered the French three-masted privateer Bellone off Cape Clear, Ireland. Bellone, of Saint Malo, had had some success privateering in the Indian Ocean towards the end of the French Revolutionary Wars. When the Napoleonic Wars commenced she took to the sea again under the command of her former captain, Jacques Perraud. She was on her first cruise of the new wars when she encountered Lord Nelson. Bellone had 34 guns, including 24 long 8-pounder guns, and though she had more guns, her broadside was inferior to that on Lord Nelson which had 20 18-pounder and 6 12-pounder guns. What made the difference was that Bellone had a crew of 260 men, versus the 102 men, exclusive of passengers, on Lord Nelson. However, Bellone also had on board some 56 prisoners from various captures. An engagement on one and a half hours now ensued. Lord Nelson was able to fend off one attempt at boarding, but succumbed to the second. In the fight, Lord Nelson had lost five men killed and 31 wounded. Two of the dead were passengers. Perraud put on board a prize crew of 41 men under the command of Lieutenant Fougie and the two vessels sailed towards A Coruņa.

Coog
08-13-2012, 23:46
The naval Battle of Hansan Island, also known as the Battle of Hansan-do, took place on August 14, 1592 near the Korean island of Hansan, and was one of the most important battles of the Imjin War. Korean admiral Yi Sun-sin destroyed at least 47 Japanese ships, captured 12 and killed over 8,000 Japanese sailors and marines. Yi's success in this battle became a turning point in the war.

Admiral Yi Sun Shin, along with the small fleet of seven ships of Admiral Won Gyun, had fought two campaigns across the southern coast of Korea. Admiral Yi Eok Ki joined Admirals Yi and Won for the third campaign. In all, the Koreans sank over 100 Japanese ships and inflicted thousands of casualties. Admiral Yi and the combined Korean fleet did not lose any ships and suffered only 11 killed and 26 wounded up to this point.

Given the importance that the Japanese navy had in supplying the army as it advanced along the Korean peninsula and prepared to invade China, Toyotomi Hideyoshi made it absolutely imperative to his commanders that the naval situation must be brought under control, the Korean fleets destroyed and the supply routes through the Yellow Sea secured. The Japanese commander, Wakizaka Yasuharu, was ordered to wait and combine his fleet with the forces of Katō Yoshiaki and Kuki Yo****aka to seek out and destroy the Korean fleet. However, it would have taken some time for Katō and Kuki to assemble their ships, so Wakizaka went out alone with 73 ships. Wakizaka's fleet probably had the best war ships fielded by the Japanese up to that point in the war. Out of the 73 ships, 36 were the large multi-decked atakebune, 24 the medium sized seki bune and 13 small kobaya scout ships.

In the meantime, Admiral Yi was planning a third campaign and worked with Admirals Won and Yi Eok Ki in combined operations and practiced arranging their fleets in a "crane's wing" battle formation. The formation was often used on land, but not normally used at sea. The combined fleets had a total of 54 panokseons and 2 or 3 turtle ships.

Admiral Yi received intelligence from a local farmer that a large Japanese fleet (Wakizaka's ships) was making its way west towards him and was anchored north of the Gyeonnaeryang Strait, a narrow channel between Geoje Island and the mainland.

On August 14, the next morning, Admiral Yi sent out six panokseon battle ships through the channel to lure out Wakizaka's fleet. Wakizaka took the bait and his ships chased Yi's six panoksons through the channel and into the broad open sea in front of Hansan Island. Wakizaka saw Admiral Yi's fleet before him and pressed to engage the Koreans. At that time, Admiral Yi began to arrange the fleet in the crane wing formation.

In the two previous campaigns, the Koreans had either met the Japanese ships in a straight battle line or, if space was limited, with a circular or rolling method of attack, where their ships attacked in relays to sustain a continuous bombardment. Although these tactics were effective, considerable numbers of Japanese had escaped and swum ashore. The crane wing formation was designed to not just sink ships, but to annihilate the enemy without losing a lot of men.

The formation itself resembled a "U" shape, with the heaviest battleships in the center and lighter ships on the wings. There was a turtle ship at the end of each side, anchoring the flanks. Reserves were placed behind the central ships and would plug gaps as the formation expanded. Ships at the front of the formation would face broadsides to maximize the number of cannons that would be aimed at the enemy. Furthermore, the "U" shape itself would allow for interlocking fields of fire so that many Japanese ships would be enfiladed and hit from several angles. In this sense the Crane Wing formation shared similarities with the late 19th and early 20th century battleship tactic of 'Crossing the T'.

The Japanese tactic was to put their fastest ships in the vanguard to keep the Korean ships occupied, then move their larger ships rapidly to close in, grapple, and board the Korean ships. However, this tactic played right into Admiral Yi's plan, as the Japanese rowed deeper into the trap. The volume and range of Korean cannon fire prevented the Japanese from employing their favorite tactic and the two wings of the crane formation would envelop, surround and finally have the effect of "crowding in" the Japanese ships, making it difficult to maneuver or retreat and "packing" in the ships and present an easier target for Korean cannons.

Wakizaka Yasuharu was a highly aggressive commander and one of the legendary "Seven Spears of Shizugatake," having gained fame in the battle that solidified Hideyoshi's claim to be Oda Nobunaga's successor. It is clear from his tactics in the Battle of Hansan Island that Wakizaka tried to get as close as possible to the Korean ships so he can grapple and board them, which was a traditional Japanese naval tactic. Wakizaka not only followed the six decoy Korean ships through the Kyonnaeryang Strait with his entire fleet of 73 ships into the ambush, but pressed as quickly as possible into the center of the crane wing formation, oblivious to the fact that he was exposing his ships and his flanks to the Korean fleet's concentrated and longer-range firepower.

The battle continued from the mid-morning to the late afternoon. Some boarding of Japanese ships by the Koreans did take place, but Admiral Yi only allowed it if the ship was already crippled and damaged. Wakisaka Yasuharu's Commanders Wakizaka Sabei and Watanabe Shichi'emon were killed. Commander Manabe Samanosuke committed seppuku aboard his burning, sinking ship. Wakizaka Yasuharu himself was hit by several arrows, but none penetrated his armor. After losing 59 ships, Wakizaka abandoned his flagship and boarded a faster, lighter ship. In total, 14 Japanese ships were able to retreat from the immediate area of the battle. However, many of the surviving ships were damaged so badly that they had to be abandoned in some of the surrounding islands that dotted the southern Korean coast. Only a few ships ever made it back to the Japanese base at Pusan Harbor.

Admiral Yi's victory at Hansan Island effectively ended Hideyoshi's dreams of conquering Ming China, which was his original goal in invading Korea. The supply routes through the Yellow Sea had to be open in order for his troops to have enough supplies and reinforcements to invade China. Thus, Konishi Yukinaga, the commander of the contingent of troops in Pyongyang could not move further north due to lack of supplies, nor could more troops be sent to him because there was not enough food to feed them. It took five times the resources in food and men to move supplies via the land route over Korea's primitive roads. Furthermore, moving supplies overland left them vulnerable to attacks by regular Chinese and Korean forces as well as Korean irregular or guerrilla forces that were becoming increasingly active as the war progressed.

After the battle of Hansan Island (and the Battle of Angolpo shortly afterwards), Hideyoshi found it necessary to give a direct order to his naval commanders to cease all unnecessary naval operations and limit activity to the immediate area around Pusan Harbor. He told his commanders that he would come to Korea personally to lead the naval forces himself, but Hideyoshi was never able to carry through on this as his health was deteriorating rapidly.

The battle of Hansan Island was the most important battle of the Imjin War. It ensured that all the fighting would be in Korea, not China, and that Pyongyang would be the furthest northwestern advance of the Japanese armies (to be sure, Katō Kiyomasa's second contingent's brief march into Manchuria was Japan's northernmost advance, however, Manchuria was not a part of Imperial China in the 16th century). It can be argued that the battle was one of the most important in East Asian history up to that point. Had Hideyoshi been able to invade China and conquer a large part of it, his plans were to also invade the Philippines and other commercially important islands in the East and South China seas. Hideyoshi's larger war plans, supported in much written documentation, was nearly identical to Imperial Japan's blue print for conquest in the second half of the 20th century.

The Royal Hajj
08-14-2012, 01:28
And let us not forget that The Royal Hajj him self was born on this day in 1795... err.. 1975!

Comte de Brueys
08-14-2012, 01:36
Congratulation, First Sealord!:)

Berthier
08-14-2012, 04:34
A jug of rum on this important day of celebration, perhaps two!

Coog
08-14-2012, 06:57
Happy Birthday Keith!

csadn
08-14-2012, 16:24
Unusually for the War of 1812, the American gunnery in this engagement was comparatively ineffective (although Pelican's sides were "filled with grapeshot" and two carronades had been dismounted). British gunnery was "at least of the standard which had brought victory in a hundred victories against the French." Allen's decision to accept battle against a heavier opponent rather than to continue his effective commerce raiding has not been explained.

Most likely a combo of: Having seen what similar US ships had done to similar British ships, coupled with the rot which invariably sets in from not engaging in actual battles (one recurring factor I see in reports of commerce-raiders is how discipline tends to fall apart on a long cruise with no action besides "fire a shot across the bow").

Side note: "Kuki Yo****aka"? I think the censorship software got a little overzealous again. :)

Coog
08-14-2012, 16:39
Side note: "Kuki Yo****aka"? I think the censorship software got a little overzealous again. :)

That's funny. I didn't notice it after I made the post...or even knew we had censorship software.

The Royal Hajj
08-14-2012, 19:32
What's the actual name, spell it out with spaces between the letters and I'll see what's up with it.

Coog
08-14-2012, 20:01
Y o s h i t a k a

David Manley
08-14-2012, 22:58
one recurring factor I see in reports of commerce-raiders is how discipline tends to fall apart on a long cruise with no action besides "fire a shot across the bow

Langsdorff being the classic example (there is ample evidence to show he knew EXACTLY what he was up against - mistook Ajax and Achilies for destroyers my a**e :)

David Manley
08-14-2012, 23:12
Allen's decision to accept battle against a heavier opponent rather than to continue his effective commerce raiding has not been explained

On the contrary, Allen's decision has been amply explained (perhaps just not read up on by the author of the wikipedia article). He had previously been the First Lieutenant of the United States at the time she captured the Macedonian so that gave him something of a misplaced feeling of confidence; Following promotion he had said that he could "take any British 22 gun sloop of war in ten minutes".

Coog
08-15-2012, 00:08
Having been First Lieutenant on United States during the fight with Macedonian, Allen should have learned of the folly of taking a ship up against a larger, more heavily armed opponent. But then sound judgement was often clouded by over-confidence and the compulsion to exhibit courage during those times, as demonstrated by the practice of dueling.

csadn
08-15-2012, 17:22
On the contrary, Allen's decision has been amply explained (perhaps just not read up on by the author of the wikipedia article). He had previously been the First Lieutenant of the United States at the time she captured the Macedonian so that gave him something of a misplaced feeling of confidence; Following promotion he had said that he could "take any British 22 gun sloop of war in ten minutes".

So, a smaller-scale version of Lawrence's idiocy with _Chesapeake_.


Langsdorff being the classic example (there is ample evidence to show he knew EXACTLY what he was up against - mistook Ajax and Achilies for destroyers my a**e :)

Actually, that's exactly the kind of sloppiness I was thinking of -- either he did in fact botch the ID on the British ships; or he got it right, and decided he could take them all. In either case, he neglected to do what he'd been sent out to do: Destroy commerce vessels.


Y o s h i t a k a [Emphasis added]

Yeah -- exactly what I figured.

Coog
08-15-2012, 22:02
Having been First Lieutenant on United States during the fight with Macedonian, Allen should have learned of the folly of taking a ship up against a larger, more heavily armed opponent. But then sound judgement was often clouded by over-confidence and the compulsion to exhibit courage during those times, as demonstrated by the practice of dueling.

Sometimes reason did prevail. While United States and her prize, Macedonian were being blockaded on the Thames River in Connecticut, Captains Decatur (United States), Jones (Macedonian), and Biddle (Hornet) had met at a local chophouse for dinner. A local sea captain, Nicholas Moran, informed them that while he had been a prisoner on the blockading squadron's flagship, HMS Ramillies, and had met the squadron's commander, Commodore Hardy and the captain of HMS Endymion, Henry Hope. Moran told them that Hope had talked about the American ships insultingly and wished they would come out and fight. The Americans sent a challenge to the British for two duels between equal opposing ships. United States would face Endymion and Macedonian would face Statira, a sister ship of Macedonian, both being of the Lively class. The British declined a match between United States and Endymion stating that the 50 gun 24-pounder frigate Endymion was inferior to the 44 gun 24-pounder frigate United States. However they would agree to set up a match between the two 38-gun frigates. Risking the Macedonian with the prospect of one or both of the American frigates running loose after the duels was acceptable. But when the focus was on Macedonian alone, the question of the importance of Macedonian was realized. She was not just a 38-gun frigate, but a great trophy and boost to American morale. If she lost the duel, the result would be devastating. Arrangements for the duel were never completed.