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Coog
05-16-2012, 06:48
The Little Belt Affair was a naval battle on the night of 16 May 1811. It involved the United States frigate USS President and the British sixth-rate HMS Little Belt, a sloop-of-war, which had originally been the Danish ship Lillebælt, before being captured by the British in the 1807 Battle of Copenhagen. The incident took place off the North Carolina coast. The Little Belt Affair was one of many incidents and events that led to the War of 1812.

The Little Belt Affair occurred four years after the Chesapeake-Leopard Affair of 1807, in which HMS Leopard had overcome USS Chesapeake, killing three, wounding eighteen, and putting four of its sailors on trial for desertion. It was fifteen days after an incident involving HMS Guerriere, a frigate. On May 1 the Guerriere had stopped the brig Spitfire off Sandy Hook in New Jersey. It had impressed Maine citizen John Diggio, the apprentice sailing master of the Spitfire. The Secretary of the Navy, Paul Hamilton, had ordered the President, along with USS Argus, to patrol the coastal areas from the Carolinas to New York.

The commanding officer of President was Commodore John Rodgers. He had left Annapolis only a few days before, and was aware of the Guerriere incident. President was off Virginia Capes and sailing up the coast toward New York. Little Belt was spotted to the east at approximately noon on 16 May. Believing it to be Guerriere, Rodgers pursued. However, Little Belt had seen President around an hour before Rodgers's order. Little Belt's captain was Arthur Bingham. When Bingham had Little Belt signal President asking for identification and received none, he noticed a blue pennant designating the ship's nationality. He continued south, but President continued its pursuit because Commodore Rodgers was interested in identifying the ship that he now knew was not Guerriere. By 15:30, the President was close enough to Little Belt for Rodgers to make out part of her stern. However, the angle at which Rodgers was seeing Little Belt made her appear larger than she actually was. In truth, Little Belt was much weaker than President, weighing only 460 tons compared to President's 1,576; the smaller ship had 20 guns, whilst President had 44.

Following the start of the pursuit, there is considerable divergence in the accounts of the parties involved. As President followed, closing the Little Belt, it appeared to Bingham that the frigate was manoeuvring into a position to rake the smaller British ship. Bingham wore ship three times to foil that action. The ships were not within hailing range until long after sunset. At about 10:15, both captains demanded that the other identify his ship, and both refused to answer before the other. Each of the captains later reported that he had been the first to ask. Shortly after the battle of etiquette had begun, a shot was fired, but again it was disputed who was first. Both ships were soon fully engaged in a barrage in which the American ship had an overwhelming advantage. After about fifteen minutes, most of the British guns were inactive, and Rodgers gave the order to cease fire. President then returned, and asked if Bingham had struck. Bingham replied that he had not, and the President again withdrew.

President sustained only one injury; Little Belt took nine deaths during the battle and 23 injuries, and the sloop was badly damaged in the attack. Two of the wounded Britons died the following day. On the morning of 17 May, American Lieutenant John Creighton went to Little Belt to lament the "unfortunate affair" and to offer space at any of the "Ports of the United States", which Bingham declined. When the captain asked why President had attacked his much smaller ship, Creighton claimed that it was because Little Belt had provoked the action. Bingham staunchly denied the account.

Creighton returned to his ship, and President and Little Belt parted ways. President sailed to New York City, and Little Belt went to Halifax, Nova Scotia under escort by HMS Goree. The two nations continued to argue about how the battle began for several months. Rodgers claimed that he had mistaken the British ship for a larger frigate and was adamant that Bingham had fired first. The Admiralty expressed their confidence in Bingham; it promoted him to Post-Captain on 7 February 1812.

On 19 August 1812, about 750 miles east of Boston, HMS Guerriere sailed into action (and her fate) against the USS Constitution. Painted across the foretopsail of Guerriere were the words "NOT THE LITTLE BELT".

Coog
05-16-2013, 21:01
Thought I would give this one a rerun.

Berthier
05-16-2013, 21:44
A great example of why GB was pre-eminent on the seas, despite being completely outgunned the Little Belt still fought it out till she could fight no more. This was often not the case with her European rivals, there definitely appears to be a completely different mind set in the RN, never take a step back, fight regardless of odds and always maintain the honour of the nation. Wish the French fleet had been able to maintain that same attitude throughout the period but for various reasons discussed elsewhere this was impossible.

7eat51
05-16-2013, 22:18
Thanks for the post Bobby. I ordered Constitution vs Guerriere in the Osprey duel series. The "NOT THE LITTLE BELT" will be in my mind as I read.

Coog
05-16-2013, 22:37
The irony of Guerriere having "NOT THE LITTLE BELT" painted on her foretopsail...she might just as well have been.

7eat51
05-16-2013, 22:39
Pride comes before a fall.

csadn
05-17-2013, 15:46
A great example of why GB was pre-eminent on the seas, despite being completely outgunned the Little Belt still fought it out till she could fight no more. This was often not the case with her European rivals, there definitely appears to be a completely different mind set in the RN, never take a step back, fight regardless of odds and always maintain the honour of the nation.

When one has *this* example abaft one:

http://www.historytoday.com/richard-cavendish/execution-admiral-byng ,

one is *definitely* disinclined to surrender prior to being shot to pieces. :)

One might say _Little Belt_ received a Big Belt -- right upside its head....

Berthier
05-17-2013, 20:26
Yes Chris, Byng was sacrificed despite pleas for clemency from numerous Admirals and members of Parliament to the King who refused all calls for leniency. I wonder how much effect this did have on future generations of RN commanders?

The famous quote that he was shot "to encourage the others" I think was Voltaire and was as much a political comment as a satirical one. The whole incident was not one of the most glorious moments in British naval annals.

csadn
05-18-2013, 14:59
Yes Chris, Byng was sacrificed despite pleas for clemency from numerous Admirals and members of Parliament to the King who refused all calls for leniency. I wonder how much effect this did have on future generations of RN commanders?

The famous quote that he was shot "to encourage the others" I think was Voltaire and was as much a political comment as a satirical one. The whole incident was not one of the most glorious moments in British naval annals.

Well, to be frank: Byng did bring quite a bit of what eventually happened to him on himself. N.A.M. Rodger's _The Command of the Ocean_ covers the details, but the short version is: The loss of Minorca caused the fall of the Newcastle Gov't, to be replaced by the Pitt/Grenville Gov't.; this gov't was friendlier to Byng than the one preceding. Expecting a full clearing, Byng was surprised to get nailed for "Failing to do his utmost to destroy the enemy" (a holdover from the English Republic era's rules for admirals). When a pardon was being considered, one of Byng's associates, a thoroughgoing fruitloop by name of Augustus Hervey, began broadcasting escape plans -- bad enough, but said plans involved French and/or Jacobin aid (yeah, *that's* going over). Worse for Byng, Voltaire (yes, that one) sent Byng a letter from no less than Richelieu expressing admiration for Byng's conduct; the letter was intercepted, and added to the list of "reasons to believe Byng was in cahoots with the French". To cap it off, the new Gov't's First Lord of the Admiralty, Earl Temple, when presenting the plea for clemency to George II, flat-out told the King he should be merciful to Byng, as the King himself was also a coward. Result: Byng ate a bullet or three.

In short: Byng was an idiot, and surrounded by idiots -- the only way he could have avoided being shot was to have been taken prisoner at Minorca.

Berthier
05-18-2013, 20:59
Good review Chris, everything worked against him including himself it seems. The name Augustus Hervey reminds there were many Hervey's in the RN some of which reached Admiral rank and there was a recent US Admiral who retired of the same name. Must be in the blood..

7eat51
05-19-2013, 23:12
Byng's recounting of the Battle:

Ramillies[1], off Minorca, May 25th, 1756.
SIR, I have the pleasure to desire that you will acquaint their Lordships that, having sailed from Gibraltar the 8th, I got off Mahon[2] the 19th, having been joined by his Majesty's[3] ship Phoenix off Majorca two days before, by whom I had confirmed the intelligence I had received at Gibraltar, of the strength of the French fleet, and of their being off Mahon. His Majesty's colours were still flying at the castle of St. Philip; and I could perceive several bomb-batteries playing on it from different parts. French colours I saw flying on the west part of St. Philip. I dispatched the Phoenix, Chesterfield, and Dolphin[4] ahead, to reconnoitre the harbour's mouth; and Captain Hervey to endeavour to land a letter for General Blakeney, to let him know the fleet was here to his assistance; though every one was of the opinion we could be of no use to him; as, by all accounts, no place was secured for covering a landing, could we have spared the people. The Phoenix was also to make the private signal between Captain Hervey and Captain Scrope, as this latter would undoubtedly come off, if it were practicable, having kept the Dolphin's barge with him: but the enemy's fleet appearing to the south-east, and the wind at the same time coming strong off the land, obliged me to call these ships in, before they could get quite so near the entrance of the harbour as to make sure what batteries or guns might be placed to prevent our having any communication with the castle. Falling little wind, it was five before I could form my line, or distinguish any of the enemy's motions; and could not judge at all of their force, more than by numbers, which were seventeen, and thirteen appeared large. They at first stood towards us in regular line; and tacked about seven; which I judged was to endeavour to gain the wind of us in the night; so that, being late, I tacked in order to keep the weather-gage of them, as well as to make sure of the land wind in the morning, being very hazy, and not above five leagues from Cape Mola. We tacked off towards the enemy at eleven; and at daylight had no sight of them. But two tartars, with the French private signal, being close in with the rear of our fleet, I sent the PRINCESS LOUISA to chase one, and made signal for the Rear-Admiral, who was nearest the other, to send ships to chase her. The PRINCESS LOUISA, DEFIANCE, and CAPTAIN, became at a great distance; but the DEFIANCE took hers, which had two captains, two lieutenants, and one hundred and two private soldiers, who were sent out the day before with six hundred men on board tartars, to reinforce the French fleet on our appearing off that place. The PHOENIX, on Captain Hervey's offer, prepared to serve as a fire-ship, but without damaging her as a frigate; till the signal was made to prime, when she was then to scuttle her decks, everything else prepared, as the time and place allowed of.
The enemy now began to appear from the mast-head. I called in the cruisers; and, when they had joined me, I tacked towards the enemy, and formed the line ahead. I found the French; were preparing theirs to leeward, having unsuccessfully endeavoured to weather me. They were twelve large ships of the line, and five frigates.
As soon as I judged the rear of our fleet the length of their van, we tacked altogether, and immediately made the signal for the ships that led to lead large, and for the DEPTFORD to quit the line, that ours might become equal to theirs. At two I made the signal to engage: I found it was the surest method of ordering every ship to close down on the one that fell to their lot. And here I must express my great satisfaction at the very gallant manner in which the Rear-Admiral set the van the example, by instantly bearing down on the ships he was to engage, with his second, and who occasioned one of the French ships to begin the engagement, which they did by raking ours as they went down. The INTREPID, unfortunately, in the very beginning, had her foretopmast shot away; and as that hung on her foretopsail, and backed it, he had no command of his ship, his fore-tack and all his braces being cut at the same time; so that he drove on the next ship to him, and obliged that and the ships ahead of me to throw all back. This obliged me to do also for some minutes, to avoid their falling on board me though not before we had drove our adversary out of the line, who put before the wind, and had several shots fired at him by his own admiral. This not only caused the enemy's centre to be unattached, but the Rear-Admiral's division rather uncovered for some little time. I sent and called to the ships ahead of me to make sail, and go down on the enemy; and ordered the Chesterfield to lay by the INTREPID, and the DEPTFORD to supply the INTREPID'S place. I found the enemy edged away constantly; and as they went three feet to our one, they would never permit our closing with them, but took advantage of destroying our rigging; for though I closed the Rear-Admiral fast, I found that I could not gain close to the enemy, whose van was fairly drove from their line; but their admiral was joining them, by bearing away.
By this time it was past six, and the enemy's van and ours were at too great a distance to engage, I perceived some of their ships stretching to the northward; and I imagined they were going to form a new line. I made the signal for the headmost ships to tack, and those that led before with the larboard tacks to lead with the starboard, that I might, by the first, keep (if possible) the wind of the enemy, and, by the second, between the Rear-Admiral's division and the enemy, as he had suffered most; as also to cover the INTREPID, which I perceived to be in very bad condition, and whose loss would give the balance very greatly against us, if they attacked us next morning as I expected. I brought to about eight that night to join the INTREPID, and to refit our ships as fast as possible, and continued doing so all night. The next morning we saw nothing of the enemy, though we were still lying to. Mahon was N.N.W about ten or eleven leagues. I sent cruisers to look out for the INTREPID and CHESTERFIELD, who joined me next day. And having, from a state and condition of the squadron brought me in, found, that the CAPTAIN, INTREPID, and DEFIANCE (which latter has lost her captain), were much damaged in their masts, so that they were in danger of not being able to secure their masts properly at sea; and also, that the squadron in general were very sickly, many killed and wounded, and nowhere to put a third of their number if I made an hospital of the forty-gun ship, which was not easy at sea; I thought it proper in this situation to call a council of war, before I went again to look for the enemy. I desired the attendance of General Stuart, Lord Effingham, and Lord Robert Bertie, and Colonel Cornwallis, that I might collect their opinions upon the present situation of Minorca and Gibraltar, and make sure of protecting the latter, since it was found impracticable either to succour or relieve the former with the force we had. So, though we may justly claim the victory, yet we are much inferior to the weight of their ships, though the numbers are equal; and they have the advantage of sending to Minorca their wounded, and getting reinforcements of seamen from their transports, and soldiers from their camp; all which undoubtedly has been done in this time that we have been lying to to refit, and often in sight of Minorca; and their ships have more than once appeared in a line from our mast-heads.
I send their Lordships the resolutions of the council of war, in which there was not the least contention or doubt arose. I hope, indeed, we shall find stores to refit us at Gibraltar; and, if I have any reinforcement, will not lose a moment of time to seek the enemy again, and once more give them battle, though they have a great advantage in being clean ships that go three feet to our one, and therefore have their choice how they will engage us, or if they will at all; and will never let us close them, as their sole view is the disabling our ships, in which they have but too well succeeded, though we obliged them to bear up.
I do not send their Lordships the particulars of our losses and damages by this, as it would take me much time; and I am willing none should be lost in letting them know an event of such consequence.
I cannot help urging their Lordships for a reinforcement, if none are yet sailed on their knowledge of the enemy's strength in these seas, and which, by very good intelligence, will in a few days be strengthened by four more large ships from Toulon, almost ready to sail, if not sailed, to join these.
I dispatch this to Sir Benjamin Keene, by way of Barcelona; and am making the best of my way to cover Gibraltar, from which place I propose sending their Lordships a more particular account. I remain, Sir, your most humble servant,
J. BYNG.
Hon. JOHN CLEVLAND, ESQ.

Footnotes:

1. The Ramillies was Byng's flagship, named after the Battle of Ramillies
2. i.e., the main port of the island.
3. King George II
4. The Dolphin was a frigate, later to gain fame as the first ship to circumnavigate the world twice.

http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Admiral_John_Byng's_account_of_the_Battle_of_Minorca

csadn
05-20-2013, 18:01
Byng's recounting of the Battle:

[...] http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Admiral_John_Byng's_account_of_the_Battle_of_Minorca

It wasn't the battle which got him shot -- tho' his overly-cautious approach did him no favors; it was his retreat to Gibraltar which really did him in. Had he either pressed on to Minorca, or kept after the French and kept them away from Minorca, he might have gotten away with it.