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View Full Version : A-hisotrical Notion: "Tra-Frigate"



csadn
02-15-2012, 18:04
As the name suggests: Assume, somehow, the US was able to field a force of frigates some 25-30 in number; then send it against a similar-sized force of British or French frigates. To generate OOBs, take an existing battle, and scale the ships accordingly.

Given the generally-higher US crew-skill ratings, the US should win a bit more than half the time; but not much more -- not every frigate was a Humphreys design, so some of the smaller ships are going to be roughly handled.

David Manley
02-15-2012, 22:51
An interesting question; I suspect if it was tried for real some of the reasons for the perceived better performance of the US frigates would become apparent - or rather the USN would suddenly find itself having to deal with issues that hitherto it didn't. Such as manning, cost of construction and maintenance etc. With such a small force of vessels and an essentially peacetime operational environment (at least compared with the situations that most active navies found themselves) the USN had a number of advantages in those soft areas that wargamers like to ignore. Now, having to man up several times the number of ships (whilst presumably covering the rest of the USN's missions and objectives) you'd see these issues becoming a reality and quality would drop.

Of course you could always assume, somehow, that to counter this fantasy US fleet the RN was similarly able to conjure up additional examples of its best assets (or perhaps was able to cherry pick the fleet to deliver an "A Team".

Although I'm not sure why anyone would really want to, unless you wanted to flog the old "my frigate is better than your frigate" dead horse again. For a decent "putting daft fleets in the place of the real fleets at Trafalgar" try the "Trafalgar 1905" scenario from Clowes' book "Trafalgar Refought". I've done that a few times, its quite spectacular (although similarly ridiculous).

csadn
02-16-2012, 16:32
An interesting question; I suspect if it was tried for real some of the reasons for the perceived better performance of the US frigates would become apparent - or rather the USN would suddenly find itself having to deal with issues that hitherto it didn't. Such as manning, cost of construction and maintenance etc. With such a small force of vessels and an essentially peacetime operational environment (at least compared with the situations that most active navies found themselves) the USN had a number of advantages in those soft areas that wargamers like to ignore. Now, having to man up several times the number of ships (whilst presumably covering the rest of the USN's missions and objectives) you'd see these issues becoming a reality and quality would drop.

Maybe -- the largest problem the US Navy faced in the Napoleonic period was the civilian leadership: One one hand, teaming with Britain wasn't going to happen for obvious reasons; on the other hand, teaming with Napoleon and his lot wasn't possible for practical reasons; and generally, the US government didn't want any part of "European problems" (which wasn't a practical response, considering trade required dealing with one side or the other -- and there weren't any practical neutral parties). So the gov't wasn't willing to pony up to run all the frigates it was having built. Solve the financing issue (by getting the US gov't to pull its collective finger out), and that's one problem dealt with.

Training wasn't a problem -- it's been repeatedly demonstrated that US frigate-crew training was as good, if not better, than any European power's ship-of-the-line-crew training (and the US learned from the finest ;) ). As noted above: Where one sees problems with US crews, it isn't the training or discipline at the core of the problem; it's the all-important manner of Pay ("Pride, Patriotism, and Pocket", as the saying went), and that was invariably the fault of the civilian powers controlling the military.


For a decent "putting daft fleets in the place of the real fleets at Trafalgar" try the "Trafalgar 1905" scenario from Clowes' book "Trafalgar Refought". I've done that a few times, its quite spectacular (although similarly ridiculous).

Indeed -- one major factor in the 1805 battle which a 1905 refight wouldn't have to deal with: Wind, Lack Of, 1 ea. Nelson's plan for Trafalgar was in-part based on wind direction; if he hit the upwind end of the CF line, the downwind end would have to turn into the wind to come support the rear. With steamships, wind is not that big an issue.

Now, if the relative crew-quality is retained, the refight is going to be even shorter than the original -- British quality plus 1905-era targeting gear, divided by Franco-Spanish crew quality (or lack thereof), equals the Combined Fleet getting absolutely hammered before it ever gets within its own engagement range. Contrast with, say, Jutland, where for the first time since 1812, a British fleet faced a force which was its equal -- or superior -- in all aspects save sheer numbers.

Which leads back to why I suggested the original idea: Fleet-level frigate engagements between the USA and Britain would be that rarest of instances in war -- both sides would be roughly equal in numbers and quality (as noted: Not every US frigate was a Humphreys -- there were units like _Essex_, or _John Adams_; nor would every British frigate be like _Macedonian_), which would make the games far more interesting.

David Manley
02-16-2012, 23:23
Training wasn't a problem

Training isn't a problem when you have a small essentially peacetime force. Multiply the size of the force by a factor of 4-5 and throw in many years of almost constant warfare and the need to get ships and crews in action deployed in the shortest time and you will now have a very different situation.


Contrast with, say, Jutland, where for the first time since 1812, a British fleet faced a force which was its equal -- or superior -- in all aspects save sheer numbers.

In all respects? Hardly. But lets leave that debate until Andrea brings out "Dreadnoughts of Glory" :)


The largest problem the US Navy faced in the Napoleonic period was the civilian leadership

Replace "US" with just about any country and you have a very good view of reality across the world from the days of the first formal navies to the present :D

csadn
02-17-2012, 16:50
Training isn't a problem when you have a small essentially peacetime force. Multiply the size of the force by a factor of 4-5 and throw in many years of almost constant warfare and the need to get ships and crews in action deployed in the shortest time and you will now have a very different situation.

That's part of it -- but there's also the question of who's doing the training, and how the training is performed. There's all-too-many generals and admirals who were excellent at getting mobs of civvies into order, but couldn't fight a battle to save their lives (excuse the pun). Get training and pay squared away, and that's 50% of any navy's problems dealt with right there. (The other half involves shunting aside staff-level officers who are too old, or are "Peacetime Professionals"; and replacing them with people who know what the hell they're doing....)


In all respects? Hardly. But lets leave that debate until Andrea brings out "Dreadnoughts of Glory" :)

Um, given the outcomes of the naval battles fought in WW1: Yes, I would say Britain and Germany were at the very least equal in quality in all aspects -- and in some aspects (for ex.: The night combat at Jutland) the Germans were going-away superior.


Replace "US" with just about any country and you have a very good view of reality across the world from the days of the first formal navies to the present :D

Civilian leadership is a problem now; but it's a slightly different problem from the Napoleonic, and earlier, periods. For ex.: In the modern era, US Senators cannot simply resign, and buy a naval commission; nor can a civilian claim a command role "because my father was one". It's one problem to have civilians with no field experience whatever trying to tell those with that experience what's-what; it's quite another to have to deal with the last vestiges of feudalism in one's command structure. (I personally find it a pity Stephen Mallory's "Regular and Provisional" system for the Confederacy never had a chance to fully play out -- he might well have hit on a means of rapidly shifting from Peace Footing to War Footing....)

David Manley
02-17-2012, 22:37
Um, given the outcomes of the naval battles fought in WW1: Yes, I would say Britain and Germany were at the very least equal in quality in all aspects -- and in some aspects (for ex.: The night combat at Jutland) the Germans were going-away superior.

Isn't that what I said? :)


That's part of it -- but there's also the question of who's doing the training, and how the training is performed.

True, as in any organisation. And again both aspects suffer in an organisation under stress. One of the fun things about what I do is that I deal with naval training organisations in the UK and elsewhere around the world, and it is interesting to see how they react to "change".

csadn
02-18-2012, 18:06
Isn't that what I said? :)

Um -- no? :)


True, as in any organisation. And again both aspects suffer in an organisation under stress. One of the fun things about what I do is that I deal with naval training organisations in the UK and elsewhere around the world, and it is interesting to see how they react to "change".

Don't get me started on "hidebound traditionalism".... :P

It helps if the right person is in charge of training -- the problem is: A general (or admiral) who does well at training will then invariably be given a field command, which not only takes him from the place where he's doing the most good, but also places him somewhere he has no business being (I follow the American Civil War -- my examples are McClellan for the Union, and Bragg for the Confederacy).

David Manley
02-18-2012, 23:26
Um -- no?

Funny, I could have sworn you suggested the High Seas fleet was superior in all respects to the Grand Fleet :)

csadn
02-19-2012, 16:56
Funny, I could have sworn you suggested the High Seas fleet was superior in all respects to the Grand Fleet :)


Contrast with, say, Jutland, where for the first time since 1812, a British fleet faced a force which was its equal -- or superior -- in all aspects save sheer numbers.

Generally speaking, the Germans were better in quality of targeting gear, damage control ("There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today"), and ammo; inferior in sheer numbers; and equal everywhere else. It's worth noting: The British took more losses overall; but looked at in terms of fleet sizes, the damage taken by each side was equal. Where the Germans lost was in rear-echelon repair capability (the RN was ready for another engagement six weeks after Jutland; the Germans weren't ready for something like a year), and in the inability to crack the blockade (what did that American say? "The prisoner has assaulted his jailor, but he remains in jail.")

David Manley
02-19-2012, 22:52
I'd agree - Germans better at night fighting (a lesson we learnt VERY well, only force that came close to the RN at night in WW2 was the IJN, at least in the early years), propellant stability, magazine handling (in a few ships only - the "bloody ships" thing only really applied to the battlecruisers that were doing strange things with their ammo handling). British better at command and control (standfast Beatty failing to open fire when he should have at the onset of the battle), situational awareness, cruiser and destroyer design and LFE (new tactics, ship design, shell design etc. all introduced over the following months and years to counter the failings brought home by the action). Other aspects - on a par. There is an oft-held view that German ships were "designed better" but post war analysis of the ships surrendered at Scapa showed this was not the case, they were just designed "differently", which is unsurprising given that the roles, missions and requirements of the two fleets were almost completely different.

csadn
02-20-2012, 14:51
British better at command and control (standfast Beatty failing to open fire when he should have at the onset of the battle),

I'd argue this point -- Beatty was off "joyriding" when he tripped over the HSF cruisers; then Hipper suckered him into a confrontation with the HSF battleships; and all the while, Jellicoe is sitting around wondering what's going on, because Beatty can't be bothered to send updates. (And do *NOT* get me started on one Ralph Seymour -- I am convinced that guy was a German agent; *no one* is *that* stupid....)

In fact, from every account I've read, the only commander who did his job properly at Jutland was Hipper: Find the enemy; bring the enemy to the main fleet; cover the fleet as it extracts (to include "Rein in dem Feind! Ran!"). Scheer and Jellicoe were too concerned with Not Losing to consider Winning; and Beatty was doing who-knows-what (and getting slit up a treat for it).

One of the "what-if" scenarios I've run for WW1 is: The Germans hold off on fighting at Jutland until nightfall, then pull a "Savo Island" on the British. The outcome is Not Pleasant for the British. (And realize: Even if both surface fleets are annihilated, the Germans still win -- U-boats, anyone?)

David Manley
02-20-2012, 15:06
I used to think that, until a friend at the NWC did an analysis and showed that the Germans actually had no idea what was going on, and manoeuvred the fleet without any real appreciation of the most likely approach of the Grand Fleet. I'm hoping I kept his postings somewhere - it was quite enlightening.


The outcome is Not Pleasant for the British.

lol, why does that not surprise me? :D