The Mauritius Campaign, 1809-1811

[David Manley]

This is another fascinating campaign, rich in frigate actions and ideal for the basis for a series of linked battles or a semi-strategic campaign in a similar vein to my "Suffren vs. Hughes" piece. Its something I'm working on at the moment (that said I've been working on it for some time - alas other stuff seems to get in the way)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mauritius_campaign_of_1809%E2%80%931811

[csadn]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mauritius_campaign_of_1809%E2%80%931811

Notable for the complete botch which was the Battle of Grand Port:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Grand_Port ,

which, coupled with the dismal performance of British frigates in the War of 1812, suggests Britain overemphasized its line-of-battle force at the expense of its frigate force.

[Berthier]

Well Nelson always complained he never had enough frigates but I dont recall him ever stating he needed one more 74.

[csadn]

Well Nelson always complained he never had enough frigates but I dont recall him ever stating he needed one more 74.

That was my point: Britain had the best line-of-battle force, no question -- but the performance of their frigates, ships and crews, is average to downright abysmal; and there never seemed to be enough of them to go around (I know -- "the food tastes horrible, and the portions are too small" :) ). Witness Nelson's attempts to find the enemy leading up to Abukir and Trafalgar.

[Berthier]

In an analogy to the situation on land, look at the problems Napoleon had in 1813-14 when he missed multiple opportunities to destroy coalition forces for want of adequate scouts due to a dearth of cavalry after 1812. The light cavalry acted in the same way as frigates, scouting, maintaining contact, carrying messages. Without them he was partially blind and partially dumb. Exactly the problem Nelson complained of.

[csadn]

In an analogy to the situation on land, look at the problems Napoleon had in 1813-14 when he missed multiple opportunities to destroy coalition forces for want of adequate scouts due to a dearth of cavalry after 1812. The light cavalry acted in the same way as frigates, scouting, maintaining contact, carrying messages. Without them he was partially blind and partially dumb. Exactly the problem Nelson complained of.

Bingo. I find it interesting how often the very same people who decry the "intelligence-gathering" services are the same people who either can't be arsed to put together a proper intel service, or flat-out ignore the services they have. Nelson at least understood the problem; Broke endeavored to fix it. :)

[David Manley]

but the performance of their frigates, ships and crews, is average to downright abysmal

An interesting statement, and just about 100% incorrect. OK, so Grand Port wasn't a shining example of how to handle frigates in a squadron action, but to dismiss the performance of the RN's frigates based on this example is like condemning the US frigates through the actions of Captain Lawrence - it might be a fun thing to to but its drawing conclusions where even a cursory examination of the wider history shows completely the opposite. The RN's frigates and unrated vessels constituted what was probably the most flexible, adaptable (and in terms of victories vs. losses the most successful) fighting force on the planet during the Napoleonic Wars, scoring hundreds of victories on sea - and on land (it was not for nothing that Sir Sidney Smith said "The frontier of Great Britain is the high water mark in France"

[David Manley]

and there never seemed to be enough of them to go around

True, and a complaint of just about every admiral before or since. Even today (and with that statement widened out to cover the whole ISTAR spectrum)

[Cmmdre]

This is another fascinating campaign, rich in frigate actions and ideal for the basis for a series of linked battles or a semi-strategic campaign in a similar vein to my "Suffren vs. Hughes" piece. Its something I'm working on at the moment (that said I've been working on it for some time - alas other stuff seems to get in the way)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mauritius_campaign_of_1809%E2%80%931811


Notable for the complete botch which was the Battle of Grand Port:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Grand_Port ,

which, coupled with the dismal performance of British frigates in the War of 1812, suggests Britain overemphasized its line-of-battle force at the expense of its frigate force.

Excellent links for frigate actions and good points about British frigates.

[Cpt Kangaroo]

David, a very timely posting for me. Thanks for the info.

I have been listening to a book on tape, one of the Jack Aubrey series called the Mauritius campaign.

http://www.google.com/#q=mauritius+command&stick=H4sIAAAAAAAAAGOovnz8BQMDgw4HsxCnfq6-gVGxRU6eEoRZkVFgriXglJ-fHZxalJlaHJIPYjswnCipZLob8-XMwkU_1Rou_WL5fHH-fwB7G4A0SQAAAA&npsic=0&sa=X&ei=t8LPUfOfDMff0QHXxIDACw&ved=0CC0Q-BY&lei=t8LPUfOfDMff0QHXxIDACw&bav=on.2,or.&bvm=bv.48572450,d.dmQ&fp=a81ea08d7413a7d1&biw=1024&bih=645

This is the backdrop of the scenario I have in mind for the upcoming Hurricon at Orlando Florida. It is in September and I am keeping my fingers crossed we get the ships in time.

I think the size and ships involved are perfect for what is being released. Also, depending on what month, there were SOLs in the area and could be added into the layout without too much of a stretch.